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THE MEXICAN SITUATION

FROM A

MEXICAN POINT OF VIEW

LUIS CABRERA

WASHINGTON, D. C., 1913

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MUCH has been said in the United States about the Mexican situation, but actual conditions in Mexico have never been fully understood, because they have always been examined from an American point of view.

The sources from which Americans draw their information about Mexico are chiefly foreign residents and investors, who are very apt to consider the Mexican situation only from the standpoint of their own interests. All that foreigners seek in Mexico is the re-establishment of a state of things favoring the continuation and promotion of business. They generally believe that the conditions of Mexicans themselves and those issues of a purely national character do not concern them, and consequently they do not regard them as necessary factors in the problem as they understand it. Hence it is that the solutions suggested, although beneficial perhaps to foreign interests, do not tend to solve the Mexican problem itself.

To fully understand the Mexican situation and to find a solution satisfactory both to Mexican and foreign interests it is necessary to review the question from a Mexican point of view.

Such is the purpose of this memorandum.

THE RULE OF THE IRON HAND

The majority of foreigners in Mexico believe that the only political problem which interests them is peace. But, misled by superficial judgment or inspired by impatience, they have believed that the establishment of peace depends only on the energy with which the country is governed. All foreigners in Mexico look for a rigorous government, an iron hand or a mailed fist, and the only thing they discuss is whether a certain man is sufficiently "strong" to control the country. And when they find a man with such qualities, foreigners always have believed that it was their duty to help that man to come into power and to support him.

These were the reasons for foreign sympathy in favor of General Reyes first, General Felix Diaz afterward, and then General Huerta; and these are the reasons why President Madero did not get full support of the foreign element. He was considered a weak man, and consequently unable to maintain peace.

It is necessary to rectify foreign opinion relative to strong Government in Mexico.

A strong Government is not one able to maintain peace by the mere force of arms, but the one that can obtain the support of the majority of the citizens of the country. Any peace obtained by the iron-hand method is only a temporary peace. Permanent peace in Mexico must be based on certain economical, political and social conditions which would automatically result in a stable equilibrium between the higher and the lower classes of the nation.

Foreigners should be persuaded that to possess real guarantees for their interests it is an essential that such interests be based on the welfare of the people of Mexico.

It is, then, to the interest of foreign capitalists to help Mexicans to obtain such conditions as would produce permanent peace.

A REAL REVOLUTION

The troubles in Mexico within the last three years are attributable to maladministration covering a period of thirty years. The internal upheaval could not have reached the present state had mere personal ambition been the motive. The revolution in Mexico could not be as strong as it is to-day were robbery the only purpose of the soldiers, or were personal ambition the sole incentive of the leaders.

The truth is that the Mexican disturbances constitute a real revolution, of apparently political aspect, but at the very bottom are of economic and social character. The present revolution is only the continuation of the revolution begun in 1910.

The present revolution's main purpose is to free the lower classes from the condition of near-slavery in which they have been held and to seek an improvement in their economic and social conditions.

In Mexico the middle class is in a formative stage. One of the results of the present revolution will be to help create such a class, thus preserving a social equilibrium in the country. Where there is no social equilibrium, there is no lasting peace; and there is no democratic form of Government without a middle class.

The Mexican situation has three principal aspects—social, economical, and political.

SOCIAL ASPECT

Mexico has a population of 15,000,000 souls, 25 per cent of which are Indians, 65 per cent mixed, or mestizos, and 10 per cent of the white race. Mexico, however, has no real race question to solve. Indians and Mestizos mix easily with people of European nationality. The really important question arises from the different races forming the population of Mexico, since we have the different stages of civilization of the different types of people. It is hard to find a Government formula to rule people of fifteenth, eighteenth and twentieth century stages of civilization. The autocratic dictatorship which might suit the Indian population is entirely unfitted for European residents, and the democratic rule acceptable by foreign residents or by highly educated Mexicans would never suit the large percentage of the illiterate classes.

ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION

The Mexican problems have been and still are chiefly economic. The colonial policies of Spain in Mexico contributed in a large measure to create privileged classes. Large tracts of land were granted to settlers or conquerors and to the Church, and thousands of Indians were compelled to live upon the tracts of the land so granted. The Indian was kept practically in a state of slavery. The independence in 1810 did not materially change the condition of the masses. After the religious struggles in 1860, the Church lost its property, but great land areas owned by wealthy families still remained as mainmort, and are at present responsible for Mexico's crisis.

The communal lands formerly owned by the towns, and which were called *egidos*, were, since about 1860, divided and apportioned among the inhabitants for the purpose of creating small agricultural properties, but through ignorance those lands were almost immediately resold to the large land owners whose properties were adjacent. This resulted in strengthening the oppressive monopoly exercised by the large land owners, as the small properties were unable to withstand the competition.

From 1880 conditions in Mexico began to be complicated, by reason of the policies of General Porfirio Diaz for the development of the country. General Diaz thought that the best way to develop the resources of Mexico was to favor the establishment of large business enterprises and the formation of large corporations, to which special advantages were offered. He granted large concessions in lands, mines, railroads, industrial and banking institutions,

to foreign investors, thus creating enormous monopolies and making more accentuated the contrast between the rich and the labobring classes of the nation. The cost of living was raised by the increase of capital. The wages of miners, railroad men and those of the industrial classes were somewhat increased, although not in proportion to the increased high cost of living. The wages of the rural laborer did not enjoy this increase, the income of the peon still remaining at a ridiculously low average. Notwithstanding the low rate of agricultural wages, the great land owners were still able to obtain labor, thanks to their political influence, which allowed them to keep the peons in practical slavery.

Farming on a small scale has not been developed in Mexico on account of unfavorable conditions for the small land holders. The large estates, called haciendas, pay only about 10 per cent of the taxes levied by law, as a result of misrepresenting the value of the property, while the small land holder is obliged to pay the whole tax imposed, as he is unable to successfully misrepresent the value of his minor holdings, and as he lacks the political influence to obtain a reduction.

The unrest produced by these economic conditions, although not clearly understood, was largely responsible for the demand for a change, which was so apparent at the close of General Diaz's administration. This economic aspect of the Mexican situation was complicated by political problems which at that time began to be raised.

POLITICAL ASPECT

The Mexican Constitution was largely patterned after the French and the American constitutions. Since the time of its promulgation, in 1857, first on account of the reform war, then because of the French intervention, and lately owing to the personal dictatorship of General Diaz, the people of Mexico have not had an opportunity to test their Constitution. It never was put into effect. Study and recent developments, however, have proved that in certain particulars the Constitution of Mexico is not fitted to the needs of the people.

THE CONSTITUTIONALIST TENDENCIES

Any party wishing to establish peace in Mexico must take in consideration these three aspects of the Mexican situation. The Constitutionalist party wishes to solve the social problem of Mexico by fostering education, so as to level the barriers between the upper and lower classes as soon as possible. The Constitutionalist party wishes to improve the conditions of the lower classes, so as

to begin the creation of a middle class. In political matters the Constitutionalist party wishes the Government of Mexico to abide by the Constitution, but at the same time advocates its reformation so as to meet the needs of the country.

EARLY SYMPTOMS

Since 1895 there has been a feeling of unrest in Mexico, which made itself more apparent during the last years of General Diaz's government. This feeling of restlessness was not well defined, and even when it led to several armed movements after 1905 it was generally thought that they were only insurrections of a local character or mere riots. When in 1908 General Diaz announced in the famous Creelman interview that he was ready to retire, public opinion in Mexico was profoundly stirred. Two opposite tendencies appeared—one instigated by the friends of General Diaz, which demanded his re-election or the election of a man who would continue his policies, and the other which wished a change in the Government and in the system.

It was at that time when Don Francisco I. Madero organized the anti-re-election party and when he began his electoral campaign under the motto, "Effective suffrage and no re-election." It was supposed that the best remedy for the Mexican situation would be a free election of a President and the enactment of a law limiting his tenure to one term. The political problem seemed to be the most important of all questions, and it absorbed entirely the public's attention, so that the economic and social problems were lost sight of.

General Diaz accepted very easily his last re-election, and permitted to be named with him as Vice President Ramon Corral, who represented the perpetuation of the old regime. No other candidates than Diaz and Corral were admitted. Madero was arrested before the elections, and the triumph of the Diaz-Corral ticket made apparent the impossibility of obtaining a political change by ballot.

MADERO'S REVOLUTION

On his escape from prison, Francisco I. Madero started the revolution. The Plan of San Luis Potosi, which was the basis of the movement, made it clear that the leaders still considered as the chief problem of Mexico a political change, and the purpose of that plan was chiefly a change of government.

The rural classes, however, followed Madero and supported him in the revolution initiated by him under the tacit belief that his revolution would bring agrarian reforms which were needed to improve the condition of the masses, but which were not yet enunciated in any concrete form.

General Diaz believed that he would stop the revolution by his retiring from power. The negotiations at Juarez, by which General Diaz agreed to retire and to deliver the government to a provisional President—the person selected by virtue of that agreement was Francisco L. de la Barra—checked the revolution precisely when it began to acquire its actual strength and real form.

DE LA BARRA

De la Barra—a vacillating and Jesuitic character—had no formative policy during his administration. As a creature of General Diaz, intimately connected with the conservative element of the old regime, he merely limited himself to muster out the revolutionary army, as the way in which he understood peace ought to be re-established.

By this negative action he minimized the effect of the revolution and he prepared a reaction in favor of the old regime. The same men who surrounded General Diaz and who had urged the continuation of his policies returned to the country when they saw that they were not to be persecuted, and started a political campaign against Madero and against the policies of the revolution. It was during this period that efforts were made to concentrate public opinion in favor of General Reyes and De la Barra himself as Presidential candidates against Madero.

It was at this same time that the clerical party, which since 1867 had shown no signs of life, was revived under the name of the Catholic party, and clearly showed that it favored the reactionary principles of the Diaz regime.

De la Barra's interim administration can be summed up by saying that while he received the government in trust, to be turned over to the Revolution, he did everything in his power to keep it for himself and to avoid the advent of the new regime, thus showing disloyalty both to Madero personally and to the revolution itself.

CAUSES OF MADERO'S FAILURE

When Madero came into power, in November, 1911, he found the government in such condition that he was unable to change its direction, and was forced to accept existing conditions and even the same Cabinet appointed by De la Barra, in which the most influential part was played by Ministers Calero, Hernandez and Ernesto Madero.

Surrounded by nearly all the Diaz people, Madero could not establish a reform policy. During all the time of his government he was constantly called by two opposite tendencies—on one side the reactionary in fâvor of the Diaz regime, and on the other side the revolutionary.

Madero tried to make friends out of the Diaz partisans, but unsuccessfully. At the same time he lost the support of the greater part of the men who had helped him during the revolution.

At the very beginning of Madero's administration a protesting movement started, which was backed by some of the old regime. The insurrections of Pascual Orozco and of General Bernardo Reyes were not more than attempts of reaction against the 1910 revolution. The insurrection of Felix Diaz, in the month of September, 1912, demonstrated that the reactionary sentiment had acquired a great importance, and that the army, which was the same army left by General Porfirio Diaz, was not in sympathy with the revolution nor with Madero personally.

A REACTIONARY MOVEMENT

The insurrection of La Ciudadela in Mexico City, in February, 1913, gave the opportunity to General Huerta of becoming the chief of the reactionary movement against the government of Madero.

General Victoriano Huerta, who had been one of the military chiefs of Diaz, had lent important services to President Madero by suppressing the revolution started by Orozco at Chihuahua. The prestige acquired by General Huerta after his triumph against Orozco began to be used by the enemies of Madero, who succeeded in convincing General Huerta of his personal strength and of his being the only support that Madero had.

During the tragic ten days in Mexico, General Huerta did not really attempt to overcome Felix Diaz. He understood that the fate of the government was in his hands, and he stood in a supine attitude until the last moment, when the pressure of foreigners and diplomats in Mexico City gave him an excuse to execute his coup d'etat.

The assassination of Madero and Pino Suarez was considered a practical way of removing obstacles to the political success of the new government. Huerta believed by the removal of the President and Vice President he was practically without enemies, and that some time must pass before the revolutionary elements could concentrate on a new leader. In this he was mistaken.

RESUMPTION OF THE STRUGGLE

During Madero's government the position of the revolutionary element was uncertain and awkward, because, while they were supposed to be exercising a great political influence through Madero, practically they had no influence whatever, since the Madero government was almost controlled by the conservative Cabinet.

After the death of President Madero the position of the revolutionary elements became clear. During his life, for reasons of loyalty and hope of a change, they had never taken an aggressive attitude against him, but once the President was dead and nothing to be hoped for from Huerta, there was no difficulty in renewing the struggle.

Huerta represented the reaction, and his government was no more than the restoration of the government of General Diaz, with its same proceedings and the same men under the orders of another chief. The revolution against Huerta is no more than the same revolution started in 1910 by Madero, and which, having been checked in 1911 by virtue of the negotiations of Juarez and the election of Madero, now continued and entered into full activity, augmented because of the revolting circumstances under which the fall of Madero had taken place. The death of Madero has been one of the most powerful sentimental factors to increase the revolutionary movement against Huerta.

AIMS OF THE REVOLUTION

It has been very widely stated that the Carranza movement has only the purpose of avenging the death of Madero and reinstating the office holders appointed by him. This is not the case. The purposes of the Constitutionalists are higher and better defined than were the motives of the 1910 movement. The Constitutionalists propose the re-establishment of a Constitutional government in Mexico, but as they realize the unfitness of the Mexican Constitution and other laws, they intend to reform them in order to have a system fitted to the country.

There is no doubt that peace in Mexico cannot be established unless a complete change takes place in the Government's personnel and in the systems and laws. This is the reason that the Constitutionalists appear too radical to those who would like to find a way of pacifying Mexico at once.

The Constitutionalists mean to begin immediately such economic reforms, and especially such agrarian reforms as are necessary to

offer to the lower classes an opportunity of improving their condition; division of large estates; equalization of taxation, and, in places where it would be necessary, the re-establishment of the *egidos* or communal land system.

THE LEADERS

Doubts have been raised as to the ability of the men leading the Revolution to carry out those reforms and to reorganize the Government and pacify the country. Such doubts refer even to the supposed inability of the leaders to overthrow Huerta and to maintain control of the Revolutionary groups. Carranza and the men who are helping him have always been described as mere bandits in Mexican and foreign papers.

This is very far from the truth.

A glance at Carranza and the men around him, and comparing them with General Huerta and his associates, makes it clear that there is a vast difference between the two, the result being in favor of Carranza and against Huerta.

Huerta is well known at present. His moral standard, his education, and his ability as a statesman are nil. His success and his political strength came from the support that he received from the conservative elements. At the beginning of his government—with the Cabinet imposed to him by the men of "La Ciudadela"—it seemed that he tried to surround himself with intelligent and honest people; but lately his Cabinet has been formed of most undesirable men, like Moheno, Blanquet and Lozano.

At the beginning of the Constitutionalist movement Carranza found it difficult to obtain the co-operation of well-known men. But time brought changes. At present his Cabinet is formed by Licenciado Francisco Escudero, a prominent lawyer of the State of Jalisco, formerly Speaker in the House of Representatives, and a man of great culture; Licenciado Rafael Zubaran, a very intelligent, straightforward and able lawyer of the State of Campeche; Ing. Ignacio Bonillas, a graduate of the Massachusetts School of Technology, of Boston, and General Felipe Angeles, a technical military man, formerly Director of the Military School in Chapultepec. The high standing and the ability of these gentlemen is far above the moral standard and ability of Huerta and his men.

The people fighting under the orders of Carranza, like the above-named gentlemen, have been made the object of the most malicious and unjust attacks in the Mexican and even in many American papers, thus creating for them such a reputation that one not well informed would hardly dare to defend them.

It is eminently proper to say that among the military leaders of the Revolution there are several persons whose uprightness, morals and intelligence are beyond discussion.

General Pablo Gonzalez and General Antonio I. Villarreal, in the State of Tamaulipas; General Jesus Carranza and General Lucio Blanco, in Nuevo Leon; General Maytorena and ex-Governor Pesqueira, in Sonora; General Alvaro Obregon, in Sinaloa; General Rodriguez Cabo and General Aguilar, in San Luis Potosi, are among them, whose conduct during the revolution has been uniformly proper and just within the rules of war.

OTHER LEADERS

Outside of these leaders, there are several other men whom the reading public has been taught to consider as bandits, absolutely devoid of any moral sense, and whose alleged atrocities are always charged to the account of Carranza. Most of the charges brought against them are false; but, without entering into details, there is a single consideration with which they can be defended, namely:

No revolution in any country or in history has been made by a man choosing in anticipation the tools that he will employ to overthrow a regime.

Revolutions start spontaneously, and in a more or less anarchic way, and the task of the leaders as the movement progresses is largely one of selecting the good and eliminating the bad and leading the movement in the right channel.

In this matter Carranza has proved with facts that whatever may have been the nature of the elements found by him at the beginning of the revolution, the character of these elements has been improved by him daily. One can see that there is a large difference in the proceedings of war employed at the beginning and the proceedings at the present time, as the leaders have acquired more control over the soldiers. As bad as the atrocities may have been at the beginning, the greater is the merit of Carranza and the Revolutionary leaders, as they have proved it was possible to continue the revolution with the same elements by improving the discipline of their forces and by creating a sense of responsibility in the small leaders, thus bringing order out of chaos.

On the other side, the military methods used by Huerta and the politicians around him, by his advisers and by the military chiefs in command of his army, are not sufficiently known outside of Mexico. Everybody would be surprised to know that Huerta's methods in fighting the rebels are bloodier and more brutal than those of the Revolutionists.

The acceptance by Carranza of Zapata's aid was considered as the most imprudent act of Carranza. This acceptance shows, however, his cleverness as Chief of the Revolution.

What is called "zapatismo," the agrarian revolution in the southern part of Mexico, exists—and ought to exist—whoever the chief of that revolution may be.

The "zapatismo" is not the result of the will of Zapata, but a special condition of the region and a peculiar aspect of the revolution in that part of the country, the result of a special economic situation, made more critical by the form of repression employed by the Federal troops.

Carranza was not free to choose between Zapata and some other leader, nor between the Zapatistas and some other army. He was bound to accept, and he did well to accept, the "zapatismo" as the only practical way of obtaining control of the Southern revolution, which has been considered as most chaotic.

THE POLICY OF NON-RECOGNITION

President Wilson's policy of non-recognition of the Huerta administration, based on both the illegality and immorality of its origin, is well justified. In refusing to support a government which tries to continue a system of personal government founded on privileges, monopolies and the predominance of great interests over the lower classes, he has done right.

The results obtained by that policy of non-recognition have been undoubtedly very important, in that they prevented the consolidation of Huerta's rule. Had the United States recognized Huerta, he would have acquired certain temporal strength; and while the revolution would not have been checked on that account, the sacrifice of life and property would have been much more considerable and the struggle would have been more protracted.

The natural impatience of European as well as certain American interests to see peace re-established in Mexico so that they may renew their business activities, has led the Washington administration to believe that it would be wise not only to assume a passive attitude toward Huerta, but to take some active steps for the purpose of eliminating him. Those active steps, which might properly be called a species of pacific intervention, might result, to be sure, in the elimination of Huerta, himself, and his cabinet, but all the other problems which the revolution proposes to solve would be left pending.

THE POLICY OF ELIMINATION

Those active steps of the American Government to eliminate Huerta, which the American press has been advocating in moments

when public opinion has been greatly aroused, has brought about results contrary to those which might have been expected, affording Huerta a chance to strengthen himself and to appear as the champion of Mexico's sovereignty.

Huerta, whose behavior at the time of the murder of Madero led him to consult and discuss his *coup d'etat* with America's Ambassador, is now, however, the ostensible defender of Mexico's sovereignty against the interference of the American Government. This attitude, while not giving him any new friends, has at least served to appease many of his enemies.

On the other hand, the good disposition of the American Government toward the Constitutionalists, or, at least, the expression of its sympathy with their ideals, has helped the Constitutionalist cause, strengthening it considerably in the public mind; but the active steps taken to bring about an understanding between the Constitutionalists and Washington, through Dr. Hale, as represented by the press, have tended to produce, in respect to Carranza, an effect totally opposite to that which Lind's mission produced with regard to Huerta; that is, the steps taken might have considerably lessened Carranza's prestige before the Mexican public had it not been for the straightforwardness shown by the Constitutionalist leader in making a frank statement that he did not desire any actual assistance from the United States or from any other foreign country in accomplishing the overthrow of Huerta. The impatience felt in public opinion and the desire on the part of President Wilson to carry out to an end his avowed purpose of eliminating Huerta, have led to the idea that an immediate solution of the Mexican crisis must be had.

In fact, there is a great desire to bring the war to an end as quickly as possible and to eliminate Huerta at the earliest moment. For that purpose various schemes have been suggested which, precisely on account of their tendency to bring about quick results, are endangering the success of the revolution. Quick results of this character would signify only a fictitious and temporary peace.

COMPROMISING

All attempts to convince Huerta and Carranza that they should abandon their pretences and agree upon a neutral candidate who would call new elections are very dangerous.

In the present struggle in Mexico we find on one side the monied elements, deeply conservative and reactionary and interested in the continuation of a regime that has the hatred of the masses; and, on the other hand, we find the revolutionary elements deeply

interested in the complete transformation of the country. Under these circumstances, no possible compromise can take place.

We know, through actual experience in Mexico, that the results of compromise between the progressive and conservative parties have always been disastrous. The administrations of Iturbide, Comonfort and De la Barra are the three most conspicuous instances of it. On each occasion a new revolution started with greater vigor than before.

THE NEUTRAL MEN

A neutral man, equally acceptable to both sides—if such a man could be found in Mexico—would have to be either openly conservative or liberal. In the first case, the compromise would amount to placing the government of Mexico in the hands of the Conservative party; but the leadership of a man who, by reason of his honorable character, or his moral standing, or his good faith in promoting the conservative cause, would make the realization of the reforms desired by the Constitutionalist party even much more difficult. In the second case—that is, if such a man belonged to the Liberal party, it can be said in advance that he would not be a man of strong personality and he would not have the firmness of character and intelligence so necessary to rule Mexico at the present time. At the stage which the Mexican revolution now has reached, the only neutral men who remain in the country are, in fact, those who, through fear, lack of patriotism, or indifference to political questions, have kept aloof. All other men of some significance who have not mixed in politics—and among which a man, perhaps, could be selected for that purpose—are men of great financial resources and who are intimately connected with the conservative elements which now rule the country.

AN IMMEDIATE ELECTION

A compromise between General Huerta and the Constitutionalists, by virtue of which Huerta would retire and Carranza would come in power, would also be very dangerous if it were immediately followed by presidential elections. Mexico has not had a chance yet to sufficiently study the present electoral laws. If the revolutionary government, once in power, attempted to immediately hold new elections, great difficulties would at once be encountered, not only on account of the present state of war, but on account of the lack of proper electoral laws to carry into effect a free and fair election.

If the revolution were checked at the present time, and immediate elections called, the conservative element would have a new opportunity to win in a farcical election by making use of the same means that up to the present time they have so successfully used in the past.

THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MADERO CABINET

There has been lately much talk about solving the political conflict in Mexico by bringing things to the same state in which they were upon the death of Madero—that is, by handing over the situation to Mr. Lascurain, or to some other member of that cabinet, and annulling all the acts of Huerta's administration from that time. This form of solving the problem would be impracticable. Furthermore, it would not be a god policy because it would amount to a mere restoration and a mere reactionary movement to put things in the state in which they were before. And the worst of all is that this restoration would place the government precisely in the hands of those who were the chief factors to bring about the apparent unpopularity of President Madero among the revolutionary elements, and the same ones who forced him to practically place himself in the hands of the Conservative party.

Mr. Lascurain is an honorable man, but he lacks personality. This he showed when he delivered the resignations of the President and the Vice President before the latter had been placed in safety. Furthermore, he is a man of considerable means and he is intimately connected with the Catholic party.

On the other hand, Mr. Rafael Hernandez, who was Minister of the Interior at the time of Madero's fall, is the member of the cabinet who was most intimately connected with the financial elements surrounding General Diaz during the last years of his administration and was the member of the cabinet who most strongly opposed the idea that President Madero should follow a policy of reform.

LAISSER FAIRE

The lack of definite ideas relative to the present situation in Mexico as well as in the United States and other foreign countries and the difficulty of fixing upon a practical way of solving the problem are due to the fact that a very quick solution has been looked for.

Any attempt to solve that problem by hasty means, seeking an immediate change of government and the immediate establishment of peace, is apt to give merely temporal and fictitious results.

The first thing to do is to impress the public mind with the idea that the present revolution in Mexico is really a social, political and economic revolution, and, as such, requires for its accomplishment a certain lapse of time and, perhaps, further sacrifices of life which, while painful to contemplate, are nevertheless necessary.

A social revolution has the same characteristics that certain cyclic diseases have among men. It is necessary and inevitable to wait for their full development, and any attempt to prematurely interrupt or check them will bring about very dangerous complications.

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